Docket Control and the Success of Constitutional Courts by Fontana, David
GW Law Faculty Publications & Other Works Faculty Scholarship 
2011 
Docket Control and the Success of Constitutional Courts 
David Fontana 
George Washington University Law School, dfontana@law.gwu.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.gwu.edu/faculty_publications 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
David Fontana, Docket Control and the Success of Constitutional Courts in Comparative Constitutional 
Law, (Tom Ginsburg & Rosalind Dixon, eds., Edward Elgar Publishing, 201) 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Scholarly Commons. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in GW Law Faculty Publications & Other Works by an authorized administrator of 
Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact spagel@law.gwu.edu. 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2256946
33. Docket control and the success of constitutional
courts
David Fontana*
I INTRODUCTION
In a chapter about comparative constitutional law, it might be surprising to start off this chap-
ter with a mention of Alexander Bickel. Bickel was no doubt one of the landmark figures in
American constitutional law. Writing in 1980, John Hart Ely called him ‘probably the most
creative constitutional theorist of the past twenty years’.1 But exporting some of Bickel’s ideas
about American constitutional law can actually inform our understandings of comparative
constitutional law as well. Bickel’s observation that the power of courts to do nothing – to
avoid deciding constitutional cases entirely by declining to grant certiorari and hear a case in
the first place – can greatly enhance the success of these courts, is an observation that can help
us understand much of the success and failure of various courts deciding constitutional cases
around the world, even beyond the United States Supreme Court. This judicial power to decide
not to hear a case is a power that I will reference as the power of ‘docket control’. It is not just
a significant power for the United States Supreme Court, but for all courts deciding contro-
versial constitutional cases.
There are many reasons why giving courts the power of docket control can contribute to
their success. Deciding what cases to decide permits a court to issue the right decisions at the
right times, what this chapter calls ‘issue timing’. A court can avoid encountering an issue until
the country is ready to discuss the issue, and perhaps ready to resolve the issue in the manner
the court is contemplating – or the court can decide to avoid the issue altogether because the
issue is too polarizing for the court to encounter. As part of this ‘issue timing’ is what this
chapter calls ‘legitimacy timing’, meaning giving the court the power to decide what to decide
allows courts both to initially create and then later maintain their legitimacy, even in situations
when political forces might not support the specific outcome ordered by the court. Courts
create and maintain their institutional legitimacy by giving political forces and the public time
to adjust to a newer style of institution – a judicial institution – deciding leading issues of the
day. But there is also a quantitative benefit to docket control, one related to legitimacy timing
and the general politics surrounding courts. Giving courts docket control permits them to limit
the sheer number of major issues they are deciding, which permits them to avoid excessive
political fights, and gives them an agenda control power that allows them to compete on more
equitable terms with the other branches of government, which do have agenda control.
Part of the argument of this chapter, then, is that courts deciding constitutional cases bene-
fit from having the power to set their agenda – but also that docket control is an indispensable
part of courts exercising this agenda-setting power. There are certainly other options that
courts have at their disposal to enjoy some of the same agenda-setting powers that docket
control gives courts. Indeed, these are some of the same options that Bickel mentioned. Courts
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can decide cases on technical grounds, as Bickel suggested. Courts can decide cases on
substantive grounds, but do so narrowly, a position most famously associated in the United
States with Cass Sunstein.2 There are many other options courts have to avoid deciding consti-
tutional cases in a broad and controversial manner.3
Certainly, as this chapter will discuss, other courts deciding constitutional cases beyond just
the United States Supreme Court have experimented with these options. But all of these other
ways of giving courts agenda-setting powers share the same limitation: even though they
involve courts in deciding constitutional issues in a less controversial fashion, they still involve
courts in deciding constitutional issues. The power of docket control gives courts the power to
avoid constitutional issues entirely, and the politics of that can often be better for courts.
This chapter should be considered an intellectual down payment on a larger project about
the role that docket control plays in contributing to the success of constitutional courts.
Because it is merely a down payment, and because of the structure of these chapters, my argu-
ments will be mostly illustrative, drawing on helpful examples to highlight some of the dynam-
ics that make docket control such a powerful contributor to the success of constitutional courts.
Later work will make the same argument and probe these examples in greater detail, using
more traditional large- and small-sample research design in different places.
For the purposes of this chapter, as well, I adopt an inclusive definition of the ‘success’ of
constitutional courts – meaning the ability of the constitutional court to have their decisions
enforced, their legitimacy respected and their political relevance ensured. As Ran Hirschl has
noted, the ‘success’ of an element of a constitution can be hard to define,4 and more precise defi-
nition must await additional papers exploring docket control. Also for the purposes of this chap-
ter, I will use the phrase ‘constitutional review courts’ to describe any high courts deciding
constitutional cases. There are, of course, courts like the United States Supreme Court which
decide constitutional as well as other cases, and courts like the German Federal Constitutional
Court which exclusively decide constitutional cases – and this phrasing of ‘constitutional review
courts’ is meant to communicate some shared dynamics about the politics of constitutional
review facing both generalist supreme courts and specialized constitutional courts.
2 THE CURRENT REALITY OF DOCKET CONTROL
With the proliferation in literature about comparative constitutional law, there is now much
literature about differences in institutional design among many constitutional review courts.
But, to this point, there is almost no literature about differences in docket control rules. This is
a substantial part of the reason why the explanatory power of these differences in docket
control rules has been neglected. As it turns out, even though the assumption is that constitu-
tional courts have no control over their dockets and supreme courts do, many forms of consti-
tutional review courts have substantial powers of docket control.
2.1 A SCHOLARLY OVERSIGHT
There is very little scholarship about docket control and constitutional review courts, along
two dimensions, one factual, the other analytical. First, while there is much literature about
the sorts of dimensions along which the structure of constitutional courts around the world
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vary, there is almost no discussion of variations in docket control as one of the dimensions of
variation. The usual presentation of institutional variations focuses on a few topics. As Lee
Epstein, Jack Knight and Olga Shvetsova have phrased it, courts differ in terms of (1) ‘who
has the power to engage in judicial review’,5 (2) ‘when can judicial review occur’,6 (3) ‘can
judicial review take place in the absence of a real case or controversy’,7 and (4) ‘who can
initiate disputes’.8 But there are additional – and, this chapter will argue, consequential differ-
ences – in the docket control process among courts, and scholars have not studied compre-
hensively the different docket control structures in place around the world.9 As an initial
problem, then, there is simply very little aggregated information about the realities of docket
control from which to draw conclusions.10
Without this simple factual information available, then, it is unsurprising that the explana-
tory powers of docket control rules are ignored. Part of the reason for missing the analytical
power of docket control differences is because the core question that institutional differences
in docket control might help to answer – what makes constitutional courts succeed or fail –
is a question that scholars rarely ask in the first place. There is a substantial literature about
the ‘origins of dictatorship and democracy’,11 the variables that might lead to the creation of
democratic regimes. There is also a substantial literature on democratic failures, headlined by
Juan Linz’s contribution and the literature it spawned.12 When it comes to the rise and fall of
constitutional courts, though, the literature is more asymmetrical. There are several different
explanations for the creation of constitutional review courts,13 but very little literature about
conditions under which the creation of constitutional courts leads to their eventual and
durable success. This chapter offers an initial explanation as to part of the reason why consti-
tutional review courts succeed, one deriving from institutional structure: the power of courts
to decide what cases they hear in the first place can help create a politics of constitutional
review that assists constitutional review courts.
2.2 Docket Control as Common Institutional Practice
The conventional wisdom, to the extent scholars have studied docket control, seems to be that
supreme courts have broad discretionary jurisdiction and constitutional courts simply have
‘no discretionary jurisdiction’.14 As Kim Lane Scheppele has written, the assumption is that
‘constitutional courts do not typically have formally recognized discretionary powers to
choose which cases they will decide’.15 Constitutional courts are supposed to be ‘anti-
Bickelian’16 in the very little power they have to ‘do neither’ and supreme courts are
supposed to be Bickelian. The actual practice of the most successful constitutional review
courts, regardless of their structure, is actually quite informed by Bickel’s ideas of the impor-
tance of the power to decide not to decide.
It is certainly the case that in many countries with supreme courts, those supreme courts
have broad powers over their docket. Since 1988 the Supreme Court of the United States has
had almost complete control over what cases to hear on appeal.17 The Supreme Court of
Canada heard 900 appeals over the past ten years, and less than 20 percent of those cases were
heard as part of the Court’s mandatory jurisdiction, with the rest subject to broad discretion
by the Court in terms of what cases it wants to hear.18 The Supreme Court of India is granted,
by the Constitution of India, control over what cases it can hear.19 The Supreme Court of
Israel, particularly when heading petitions as the High Court of Justice (HCJ), has some
discretion in deciding what cases fully to adjudicate and decide.20
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Despite the conventional wisdom, though, constitutional courts in addition to supreme
courts have broad control over the cases that they want to hear. Consider the German Federal
Constitutional Court (FCC), the ‘most active and powerful constitutional court in Europe’.21
The FCC can hear constitutional claims either by abstract review, concrete review, or by the
filing of a constitutional complaint. Abstract review cases must be brought by specified
members of the government.22 It is difficult for the FCC to avoid deciding these cases, but as
a practical matter there have only been on average less than three a year brought to the FCC
– and because of consolidation and other procedural details, the FCC has only decided about
half of these abstract review cases.23
Concrete review cases are cases where a lower court not entrusted with jurisdiction
over constitutional cases finds that there might be a constitutional problem in the course
of addressing other legal claims.24 The FCC can decline to hear these cases because it only
need hear these cases if the case presents major implications for lower courts and the FCC
is convinced of the unconstitutionality of the action, rather than simply harboring
doubts.25 The number of concrete review cases under Art. 100 (1) of the Basic Law is
substantially lower than the number of constitutional complaints as well, so combined
with the FCC’s discretion not to hear these cases, they constitute a tiny part of the docket
of the FCC.26 As an empirical matter, the overwhelming majority of cases are brought to
the FCC as constitutional complaints – a full 96 percent of the caseload of the FCC, by
one count.27 The FCC only grants review in less than 1 percent of the constitutional
complaints it receives.28
The same institutional structure and constitutional review court docket control is true of
many of the world’s other constitutional courts. In Hungary, the very active and quite power-
ful constitutional court only decides a case as the whole court if a statute is being reviewed.29
If the challenge is to an administrative regulation, then the case is disposed of by a three-judge
panel.30 Because of this and other docket control rules, in its first three years the
Constitutional Court of Hungary considered about 6000 petitions and only published between
200 and 300 decisions each year.31 In Brazil, much of the recent success of the court has been
related to Constitutional Amendment 45, which permits the Supreme Federal Court to decline
to hear a case if it does not present an issue of general importance.32
3 WHY DOCKET CONTROL MATTERS
3.1 The Explanatory Power of Docket Control
3.1.1. The timing of constitutional review
Part of the reason why having control over the cases that it hears can contribute to the success
of constitutional review courts has to do with timing. Docket control permits a constitutional
review court to address a constitutional issue when the timing is right for the court success-
fully to intervene to decide that issue – what I will hereinafter called ‘issue timing’. Docket
control also permits a constitutional review court to address a constitutional issue at a time –
and, as discussed later, at a pace – that allows the court to create and ensure its own legiti-
macy (what I will hereinafter call ‘legitimacy timing’). As compared to other means of avoid-
ing constitutional controversies, docket control leads to a political dynamic that better assists
constitutional review courts.
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There are many reasons why a constitutional court might want to avoid deciding a partic-
ular constitutional issue altogether, or might want to avoid deciding a constitutional issue
until the timing is right. We start with a simple statement: not all constitutional issues that
constitutional review courts decide are created equal. A decision on the Dormant Commerce
Clause in the United States, for instance, does not have the same salience –  or the same judi-
cial politics dynamic – as a case involving abortion.33 Some constitutional issues presented
to courts might be so polarizing that a judicial decision on the issue could generate more polit-
ical toxins, either forever or at a particular time, than the court could manage. By deciding a
case, the constitutional review court would be taking sides on the issue, which would inflame
passions on the losing side so much that it could lead to a dangerous political dynamic.
Not only would deciding a case related to the issue generate a firestorm from the losing
side, but the nature of the debate between the competing sides might present a ‘clash of
absolutes’.34 Therefore, not only would a judicial decision on the issue be viewed as incor-
rect by the losing side, but also it might be viewed as immoral or manifestly unjust. The other
branches of government might also decide to avoid this polarizing issue for the same reasons
that the constitutional review court does, which, as discussed later, would create problems for
the constitutional review court if it does not have the identical power to avoid issues.
In the American system, a good example of the Supreme Court using its power of docket
control to avoid entering a polarizing political debate entirely was its decision to deny certio-
rari to hear cases related to the constitutionality of the Vietnam War.35 The legitimacy – and
therefore, in part – the constitutionality – of the Vietnam War was an intensely polarizing
issue,36 but the Court never decided a case that directly addressed the constitutionality of the
Vietnam War.37 If the American Supreme Court had in fact addressed the constitutionality of
the Vietnam War, it would have survived, because of the support it enjoys. In countries where
the constitutional review courts occupy a more precarious position, deciding a polarizing case
at all, at any point in time, could lead to the destruction of the court.38
In other situations, courts avoid deciding a polarizing issue for some time, until the polit-
ical timing is more conducive. Although Brown v Board of Education was intensely polariz-
ing at the time it was decided by the United States Supreme Court,39 if a case like that had
been presented to the Supreme Court and decided before then, the Supreme Court could have
been seriously damaged. With not just an unsympathetic South and therefore part of
Congress, but an unsympathetic President and all of Congress, who knows what might have
happened if Brown had been decided years earlier.40
Other constitutional review courts that have experienced success likewise either avoided
entirely or delayed deciding polarizing constitutional issues. In Israel, the Supreme Court of
Israel has three roles, but in one of them it sits as the High Court of Justice (HCJ), with the
power to decide what petitions fully to adjudicate.41 The Israeli Supreme Court decided
explicitly as early as 1969 that judicial review of some sort was authorized,42 but it did not
decide many major cases until years later. For years and years cases were brought to the HCJ
questioning the legality of different military actions in the occupied territories – and for years
and years the HCJ largely declined to decide these cases, with some exceptions.43 During this
time, the HCJ tended to ‘impose strict limitations on the ability of litigants to raise political
issues in court’.44
It was not until 1979 that the HCJ decided a number of major cases related to the occupied
territories.45 Part of the reason for this had to do with the changing political climate in Israel,
making the timing better for the HCJ just as it was for the American Supreme Court deciding
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Brown in 1954; and part of it was, as discussed later, because enough time had passed for the
HCJ to establish a degree of core legitimacy (‘legitimacy timing’). After these 1979 deci-
sions, the HCJ issued other occasionally consequential decisions, but it was not until the
1990s when it started to issue many major decisions – and, by that time, the Israeli Supreme
Court in general was wildly popular and seen as deeply legitimate, even while other branches
of government (except the army) were not.46
More recently, many of the world’s most successful constitutional review courts waited
several years – until the politics of the situation had cooled off some – before deciding major
cases related to the responses by the political branches to the events of September 11. The
High Court of Australia issued its first major decision in 2007.47 The FCC in Germany
declined to hear several cases,48 and did finally address a case related to the European Arrest
Warrant in 2005.49 The House of Lords issued its first major decision in 2004.50 The Supreme
Court of India issued its first major decision in 2004.51 The United States Supreme Court did
not decide its first cases until it decided three of them in 2004.52
Another reason why docket control can contribute to the success of constitutional review
courts is a notion related to the idea of issue timing, what I will call ‘legitimacy timing’. If issue
timing is about the importance of the court deciding the right issue at the right time for the issue,
then legitimacy timing is about the court deciding the right issue at the right time for the court.
A constitutional review court might want to wait to decide an issue until the timing is right, and
the timing might never be right. But the time must also be right for the court, and where the
constitutional review court sits in the public and political dynamic of the country.
A preliminary concept must be addressed. Constitutional review courts might enjoy two
different genres of support. One genre, ‘specific support’, refers to the support for a constitu-
tional review court because of support for the particular decisions issued by that court.53
Another and more challenging form of support that constitutional review courts might benefit
from is called ‘diffuse support’. Diffuse support is ‘a reservoir of favorable attitudes or good
will that helps members to accept or tolerate outputs to which they are opposed or the effect of
which they see as damaging to their wants’.54 It is agreeing to disagree; the support that courts
enjoy from members of the public or political figures who disagree with particular decisions but
agree with the court’s ability to make them, and therefore support the fundamentals of the
constitutional review court even after that court issues a specific decision with which they
disagree.
Most courts, even in established democracies, do not enjoy diffuse support in the eyes of
most of the population.55 For most courts then – since most courts have to survive simply on
specific support – deciding an issue that leads to any meaningful disagreement or political
backlash can be dangerous. The mandatory portions of the dockets of the German FCC and
the Supreme Court of Canada provide good examples. In Canada, although the docket of the
Supreme Court is largely discretionary,56 the Supreme Court must hear reference cases
brought to it by the political branches, unless there is some tangential jurisdictional issue.57
This has brought the established Canadian Supreme Court into political trouble when it had
to deal with issues such as the Quebec Secession Reference.58 In then-West Germany, the
FCC in its early years accepted very few cases involving meaningful constitutional disputes
– indeed, of all of the cases filed it before it in 1955 using the constitutional complaint proce-
dure, only one case was admitted and decided by the FCC.59 But then the FCC faced an
abstract review challenge to German participation in some of the defense treaties of the new
European government,60 a case that the FCC was of course obligated to decide.61 Ultimately,
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this situation might have helped the FCC, but in the short term it put the new FCC in a precar-
ious position because it involved it in a major political battle of the day – and the FCC had
no choice but to decide these cases.62
Particularly when the constitutional review court is new, and trying to transition from
having simply specific support to enjoying a deeper legitimacy in the society, docket control
is crucial. Early on during the existence of a constitutional court, political coalitions or the
general public might not be ready for the constitutional court to decide cases. As a newer
institution, the exercise of power by the court (even if it is just to decide the case on techni-
cal as opposed to substantive grounds) might seem alien to these political coalitions or citi-
zens, and therefore more threatening. Moreover, it is often the case that the constitutional
court might be staffed by judges tainted from their associations with previous autocratic
regimes.63 It is not surprising, then, that courts that have been in operation for some time
seem to be more popular than courts in operation for a shorter period of time, even control-
ling for other factors.64
At first, then, when the court is only supported if the outcomes of its decisions are
supported, then the court can decide to hear cases that will not antagonize the public, perhaps
even by focusing on lower salience issues to create a reservoir of support and trust from the
public. Since a series of specific decisions that the public supports can lead to the creation of
diffuse support and a stronger foundation of support for the court,65 over time the court can
then grapple with more controversial and complicated issues as it builds diffuse support.
Many of the most successful constitutional courts have used this strategy, with great
success. For one example of this strategy, consider the Constitutional Tribunal of Poland. The
Tribunal started its operations in 1985, and was granted the power of judicial review in
1986.66 At first, the Tribunal functioned simply as an administrative court, reviewing what
the executive could do by decree.67 The Tribunal simply policed the process of lawmaking,
not the ultimate substantive acceptability of laws. Eventually, though, starting in 1989, the
Tribunal started to review the substantive constitutionality of statutes.68 Many of the targets
of its constitutional invalidations were the surely unpopular laws from the old Communist
regime.69 Later, the Tribunal started to decide cases related to the major constitutional issues
of the day. In 1991, for instance, the Polish Constitutional Tribunal invalidated an important
pension reform statute.70
The more established Western constitutional courts adopted a similar strategy when the
power of constitutional review was first established. Many forget that the United States
Supreme Court was in operation for 14 years before it decided Marbury v Madison,71 and it
had three Chief Justices before it had John Marshall. During that time, the Court avoided
major constitutional disputes. As William Michael Treanor put it, the ‘Court upheld the one
substantive congressional statute that it examined, and it did so even though there was a very
strong argument that the statute ran afoul of constitutional text’.72 The Court instead
addressed the constitutionality of congressional statutes dealing with jurisdictional as
opposed to substantive issues, and even then had very few cases of that sort.73 In France, it
was thirteen years after the creation of the Constitution of the French Fifth Republic before
the French Conseil Constitutionnel clearly stated that constitutional review was authorized by
the French Constitution.74
3.1.2 The quantity of constitutional review
Part of legitimacy timing has to do not just with what cases are being decided and when, but
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how many cases are being decided. Deciding too many cases can be damaging to established
and secure, as well as new and vulnerable, constitutional review courts. Constitutional review
courts deciding many cases are creating many losing parties, meaning many political enemies
and many political battles. In order to fight these battles, the court is at a severe disadvantage;
deciding many cases will create political criticism that simply exceeds the available sources
of political support that the court can use to fight back, and also is difficult for courts to
handle because of the institutional disadvantages created by less discretionary agendas for
courts and more discretionary agendas for political actors. In a system with a stable constitu-
tional court, that might lead to a significantly weakened court; in a system with a fragile
constitutional review court, this might lead to the elimination of the court altogether.
It should not be surprising, then, that many of the major constitutional review courts
around the world fully decide just a small number of cases per year. The Supreme Court of
the United States decides about 80 cases a year by full opinion, and less than half of these
involve constitutional issues.75 The Supreme Court of Canada decided 74 cases last year.76
The Italian Constitutional Court decides about 500 cases per year.77 The French Conseil
Constitutionnel decides about 100 cases per year.78 The Russian Constitutional Court decides
about 211 cases per year.79 Part of the success of the newer constitutional review courts in
Central and Eastern Europe is because they spent their earlier years deciding only about 50
or so cases.80
There is a very simple reason why permitting constitutional review courts to avoid decid-
ing many cases helps them: quantity negatively correlates with quality. There is good reason,
including some experimental evidence,81 to believe that reasoning affects the legitimacy of
constitutional review courts, so more time might mean better reasoning and more legitimacy.
The more cases a court has to decide, the less convincing its decisions will be, and it would
simply be impossible for constitutional review courts to decide all or many of the cases they
are faced with given the sheer number of those cases. Particularly with constitutional review
courts first trying to establish themselves – and prove that they are legal as opposed to polit-
ical bodies – quality legal reasoning might be important, and the sheer number of cases these
courts face82 makes docket control therefore crucial.
But the politics of high volume constitutional courts might present an even bigger obsta-
cle. The more cases that the court decides, the more enemies the court will be making,
because the more parties the court will be ruling against. Many of these enemies might be
politically inconsequential, or politically consequential but aggrieved about an issue of such
low salience that these enemies can not use the court decision successfully to attack the court.
In Hungary, for instance, the mostly successful Hungarian Constitutional Court decided many
controversial cases in its earlier years.83 By 1995, the Court had issued so many constitutional
decisions that the number of political enemies conspiring against the Court had grown. The
Court invalidated 26 provisions of an important law to reduce the economic impact of the
Hungarian welfare state, and angered factions in the government attacked the Court for the
first time.84
Not just are more enemies created to fight against, but with more cases decided, the politi-
cal tools that courts can use to fight for their interests are reduced. Jeffrey Staton and Georg
Vanbeg have written convincingly about how constitutional courts can use the power of
publicity to convince other branches of government to comply with court decisions.85 Staton
and Vanberg are writing mostly about constitutional review courts that are not in dire straits,86
where the support for courts is higher than for political institutions. In those situations, by
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drawing attention to court decisions, these courts compel the other branches to implement the
decision because political actors do not want to ignore a public which both likes the consti-
tutional court and is aware of what the constitutional court has said those other branches of
government should do. Courts cannot equally publicize all decisions, and courts do not neces-
sarily have many members of their staff. Courts can only issue so many press releases,87 write
so many opinion essays, be interviewed on television so many times. If the constitutional
review court is forced to decide many cases, that means that some of its decisions might be
politically vulnerable because the court won’t be available to take the political steps to protect
those decisions.
Regardless of whether the constitutional court is popular or not, though, any court needs a
‘support structure’ to implement their decisions.88 After constitutional review courts issue
decisions, there must be other actors in place to implement and enforce and support their deci-
sions. Even after the constitutional review court issues its decision, for decisions not to be
undermined there must be other groups who ‘have coordinated research, facilitated the
exchange of ideas and generated publicity around … agendas’.89 A constitutional review
court issuing many decisions might simply overburden the support structure. This is particu-
larly true in countries with smaller support structures, where the constitutional review courts
might need the assistance of the support structures even more. For instance, in Costa Rica
only 99 percent of citizens are involved in civil society activities, and in Colombia 8 percent
– with the comparative number in the United States being a substantially larger 27 percent.90
Docket control can be crucial to constitutional review courts not only to help them fight
political enemies effectively, but also to help them fight fairly. Legislatures and executives
generally face few constitutional constraints on their agenda for a particular year.
Constitutions include many negative restrictions on what the political branches are permitted
to do. Even with the increasing spread of positive obligations that the political branches face,
these obligations generally require minimal action on the part of the political branches and do
not compel their agenda in any meaningful manner. Positive obligations might be vague. As
Mark Tushnet has described it, they might be merely ‘declaratory rights’.91 The Constitution
of Ireland mentions ‘Directive Principles of State Policy’,92 but states that these are simply
‘intended for the general guidance of the [Parliament]’.93 Constitutional rules providing
simply ‘general guidance’ do not mean that the Parliament of Ireland has much in the way of
a compelled agenda.
Sometimes these rights might be what Tushnet calls ‘weak substantive rights’,94 such as
the command in the Constitution of South Africa that ‘[t]he state must take reasonable legisla-
tive and other measures, within its available resources, to achieve the progressive realisation
of this right’.95 Again, the political branches need not do much to comply with this obliga-
tion, and even if the government must act, often this can be delegated to administrative offi-
cials rather than something that must be addressed directly by the legislature or high-ranking
executive officials. If positive obligations are more concrete, commanding a specific result
(the Constitution of Mexico, for instance, guarantees that ‘[f]or every six days of work a
worker must have at least one day of rest’96), these might be self-executing and not require
much time or effort on the part of the political branches.
The contrast with a constitutional review court with limited or no docket control should be
clear. Even if political branches faced constitutionally compelled agendas, these agendas
would be simply to focus on issues. By contrast, constitutional review courts can be
compelled to focus on these issues, as well as or perhaps by focusing on specific petitions
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brought by individual parties. As a practical matter, of course, constitutions tend not to
compel political branches to do anything in the first place.
Agendas are also not fixed – if a problem or a complaint is not solved by one branch of
government, then it might need to be solved by another branch. It is often the case that polit-
ical branches of government might manipulate the constitutional review courts to serve their
own political agenda. One facet of this might be what Keith Whittington has observed,
whereby judicial review is encouraged and furthered by political actors wanting to avoid
controversial issues and therefore pass them on to courts.97 Another facet might be politicians
using courts to gain attention for their own causes98 – but without having to resolve these
causes through their own, singular, heroic but potentially risky political actions. Either way,
if political actors can manipulate the agenda of courts, they might well do so; and this puts
courts at a disadvantage if they do not have the capacity to control their agenda as well. In
other words, then, if the design is to create some semblance of equity between the branches,
docket control is a must.
3.2 Imperfect Alternatives to Docket Control
As mentioned earlier, there are certainly many tools that constitutional review courts have to
avoid deciding entirely a polarizing issue, or to wait before deciding polarizing issues.99 But,
even with those tools at its disposal, the power to decline to hear a case entirely occupies a
special position. The decision not to hear a case can be more politically innocuous than decid-
ing a case, but on secondary grounds. One reason is the ‘clash of absolutes’ logic described
earlier. If any action related to these issues is highly consequential and morally tinged, then
deciding a case, even on tangential grounds, could be more morally offensive and politically
provoking than simply avoiding an issue altogether.
This is because, in many ways, deciding a case on tangential grounds is still deciding the
case, while declining to hear the case altogether is practically and legally different. There are
certainly many examples of constitutional review courts using tangential grounds to decide
cases as a means of avoiding the core substantive issues. The Hungarian Constitutional Court
in its first years decided its first abortion case on the grounds that the abortion rules were
passed not through statute but through regulation.100 The Russian Constitutional Court ruled
on the constitutionality of the war in Chechnya by looking at whether the rules and process
leading to the commencement of wars were followed, not whether the actual war itself was
constitutional.101 The sorts of concerns similar to the legitimacy timing concerns mentioned
before surely played a part in the nature of these decisions – vague decisions or decisions
ordering weak remedies pose less risk of non-compliance and therefore less of a threat to the
legitimacy and power of the constitutional review court.102
While these are welcome tools for constitutional review courts to have at their disposal,
having the power not to decide a case in the first place is also important – and different. If a
constitutional review court decides to hear a case, there will be full briefing of the case,
discussions of it in law schools and law journals, coverage of the case in newspapers, and
debate about the issue among political figures. It is often only later that stakeholders know
the constitutional review court will decide the case on tangential grounds, so all of the heat
and intensity generated by the process leading to a substantive constitutional decision is
generated by the process leading to a tangential decision. One study of the debates leading to
decisions by the Israeli Supreme Court found ‘[t]he greatest portion of media coverage for
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political petitions does not refer to final court decisions but rather to earlier phases of the
process: threats, the issuance of petitions, and most notably court proceedings while the peti-
tion is still pending’.103 By contrast, if the constitutional review court declines to hear the case
in the first place, that whole process and publicity and attention is eliminated before it even
starts.
In part because of this different amount of pre-decision attention, there is a different polit-
ical dynamic following a decision not to hear a case as compared to a decision on a tangen-
tial ground. Decisions by constitutional review courts not to decide cases rarely generate
newspaper attention, and rarely generate political attention.104 By contrast, decisions about
major constitutional cases can generate much attention. When the HCJ in Israel decided their
first series of major cases related to the occupied territories, one of the major newspapers
printed these decisions verbatim over four pages in the newspaper.105
In this way, decisions not to hear a case impose no direct political costs on constitutional
review courts, since they are decisions made with no attention, and therefore little oversight
or accountability. The constitutional system – more generally and longitudinally – might
suffer by the incoherence and lack of clarity that results from inaction by the highest consti-
tutional review court in a country. The constitutional review court might suffer gradually,
systematically from these results. But these costs are more diffuse and gradual. By contrast,
decisions by constitutional review courts to decide a case on tangential grounds generate
more attention and more immediate and tangible risk. If the HCJ had decided a case related
to the occupied territories in any way, regardless of how technical, it would have made front-
page news. A decision not to decide receives far less attention.
3.3 The Dangers of Docket Control
The sorts of powers and opportunities for success presented by docket control discussed
above also carry with them some obvious dangers. Deciding when to decide might be an
action constrained very little by law, and controlled very much by political judgment. This is
precisely the sort of judgment that constitutional review court judges might have in low
amounts, while the actors they are competing against have it in greater amounts. The danger,
then, created by docket control is the danger created by granting a more overtly political
power to a formally legal branch of government.
But this danger is not merely theoretical. There are several examples of constitutional
review courts miscalculating in their use of their docket control, and paying a severe price for
it. The early failures of the Constitutional Court of Russia after the dissolution of the Soviet
Union are a good example of this. In December 1991, the new Court went into operation, with
Valery Zorkin as the Chairman of the Constitutional Court.106 The Court had enormous
discretion about what cases to hear. It received about 1700 complaints in its first year.107
Most of the complaints were rejected by the Registry of the Court, but a small number went
forward and were submitted to one of the specialized divisions of the Constitutional Court.108
These specialized divisions would then prepare a report, the Court would deliberate about this
report and decide whether to move forward with the case based on this report, and if it did
decide to go forward, Zorkin would assign the case to a particular Justice to lead the Court’s
discussion and decision on the case.1099
In less than two years, the Zorkin Court used this discretion to issue 20 decisions invali-
dating exercises of executive or legislative powers, including cases involving controversial
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issues related to banning the former Communist Party or taking over media outlets.110 At the
same time, the Court did little to decide cases that would receive broad and cross-cutting
support from the public. It decided very few cases related to human rights, deciding only six
cases on these issues in its first 16 months.111 Most members of the Court insisted that the
Court focus on the political crisis between the new President Boris Yeltsin and the Duma and
not on the human rights concerns faced by average citizens.112 It should not be surprising,
then, that a poll in January 1993 found a meager 10 percent of the population trusted the
Russian Constitutional Court – while 23 percent trusted the President.113
Eventually, then, this Court was abolished.114 The Court that was created to replace it
eliminated much of the docket control that the previous Court had enjoyed. The previous
Court could reject a petition if it considered review of the case ‘inadvisable’;115 the new Court
seems to have fewer screening standards.116 Even under the new regime, though, the Russian
Constitutional Court does not have to fully adjudicate all cases brought to it. Between 1994
and 1999, the Court received about 15,000 petitions, and about 98 percent were dismissed by
the Secretariat of the Court.117 That left 300 cases brought to the full Court, and the Court
decided only 39 of those fully on the merits.118
While there are reasons to believe that constitutional review courts will constantly make
mistakes in their use of docket control, there are also reasons to believe these mistakes are not
fundamental or crucial. Constitutional review court judges do not come from purely legal
backgrounds. Constitutional review court judges in all sorts of constitutional democracies are
appointed by political officials. In the United States, Supreme Court Justices are appointed by
the President with the advice and consent of the Senate.119 In France, the members of the
Conseil Constitutionnel are appointed one-third by the President, one-third by the President
of the National Assembly and one-third by the President of the Senate.120 The basic logic is
essentially the same across all constitutional democracies: the appointing individuals are
elected, and so the judges they appoint are likely to be tied to, and not entirely unaware of,
the political process. However technical appointment and promotion might be in some lower
courts in some countries, appointments to constitutional review courts are almost always
political in part.
After their appointments, constitutional review courts are not entirely unaware of the polit-
ical situation surrounding the constitutional issues presented to their courts. Constitutional
review courts are facing thousands upon thousands of petitions every year. The Supreme
Court of the United States receives about 7000 petitions per year.121 In Argentina, the
Supreme Court receives 26,000 petitions per year. The Supreme Federal Court in Brazil in
2001 had 110,771 petitions filed before it.122 These petitions – the stories they present, the
lower court decisions they embody – serve as information to the constitutional review court
about how different constitutional issues are faring in the general public, and in the political
system. Constitutional review does not just generate outcomes, it provides information to
constitutional review courts.123
Of course, there were concerns voiced in response to Bickel’s initial articulation of the
benefits of docket control decades ago. These concerns were largely normative in a theoreti-
cal as opposed to an actual way. Gerald Gunther, in his famous response to Bickel’s argu-
ments, criticized Bickel for his lack of devotion to principle.124 Beyond that, according to
Gunther, by declining to hear cases, the Supreme Court was not offering reasons in the first
place, so there was very little candor about what was transpiring.125 Gunther’s concerns are
conceptually valid, but as mentioned before, denials of cases receive virtually no public or
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political attention. The reality, then, of a political actor or the public finding the lack of prin-
ciple or lack of candor troubling are quite slim.
There might also be a concern that empowering constitutional review courts to avoid
constitutional cases will lead to even more ‘underenforced constitutional norms’126 than is
necessary. Indeed, the underenforcement of constitutional rights by constitutional review
courts can weaken these courts sometimes just as much as the overenforcement of rights
can.127 I will have more to say about this in other writings on docket control, but for now it
is worth noting that this is part of the reason that other courts have taken up the cause of
protecting constitutional rights. In the years before the Canadian Supreme Court intervened
in issues related to September 11 – and indeed even since then – the lower courts have issued
many decisions protecting constitutional rights.128 The same has become true even in coun-
tries where only constitutional courts are supposed to protect constitutional rights, but other
courts have found ways to issue decisions that have the same effects of protecting constitu-
tional rights. These decisions all exist outside of the major national politics that both precedes
and follows decisions of the highest constitutional review courts.
4 CONCLUSION
The burgeoning literature on comparative constitutional law has led to a burgeoning literature
on constitutional design. The institutional structures put in place in constitutions, according
to this emerging area of scholarship, might play a substantial role in the later emergence of
this constitutional order. The predictable elements of constitutional design have been studied
at length: whether to create presidential, parliamentary or semi-presidential regimes; the
terms of constitutional court judges; and so on.
But, at the end of the day, no institutional structure turns out to be more important for the
judicial branch created by a constitution than the control given by that constitution and related
documents to the courts created. It is almost universal for political actors to receive control
not just over the decisions they make, but of the issues they decide to focus on in the first
place. Likewise, giving courts – particularly constitutional review courts – the ability to
decide what to decide proves crucial to the success of these courts. A court empowered to set
its agenda is a court that can avoid excessive political conflict and ensure maximum compli-
ance. For new courts and old courts alike, then, there is no issue more important than an issue
that appears to be the most simple: the content and structure of the docket of the court.
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